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SonIA Cyber · the technical defence viewpoint

Defend systems and plants, with the evidence in hand.

IT security inside the product and, as a service, industrial plant security following IEC 62443: one critical plant at a time, observing without touching.

It is the same product as SonIA SRM: same access, same modules, same data. Same-day activation.

Illustration of a plant divided into zones, with a conduit between one zone and the next. For simplicity it shows three of the five in the example: the plant network with the cabinets, supervision with a workstation, the cell with the controllers and a tank. plant networksupervisioncontroller cell
Compatible withNIS2 D.Lgs. 138/2024DORA Reg. (EU) 2022/2554 · ICT third partiesGDPR art. 28ISO/IEC 27001 93 controlsIEC 62443 industrial plants
IT security

Compliance and controls, in one workstation

For those who look after the security of their own company or of several client companies.

NIS2 self-assessment

Scope from the annexes, baseline measures with evidence, score and remediation plan in PDF with priorities, owners and dates.

ISO/IEC 27001

Statement of applicability with the 93 controls.

ICT suppliers and incidents

Register of ICT suppliers with their risk; incidents with guided notification.

Passive, authorised checks

Domain names, certificates, security headers and mail of the authorised domains; what they find goes into the risk graph.

Night sentinel

Every night it compares the declared versions of the systems with exploited vulnerabilities.

Impact in euros

Every risk and every attack path becomes an explained loss in euros, with the “what if” simulator.

Why IEC 62443

Industrial plants need a standard of their own

In Italy the NIS2 directive is D.Lgs. 138/2024 and the competent authority is the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN). Those who manufacture, distribute energy or run essential networks and services must show that they govern risk even where the machines work.

The national reference framework was created for IT systems and covers little of plants, industrial IoT and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. IEC 62443 fills that gap: it divides the plant into zones, governs the conduits that connect them and sets a security level for each zone.

Compatible with

SonIA Cyber is compatible with IEC 62443 and with NIS2: it organises the work the standards ask for and keeps the evidence. It is not a certification.

SonIA CybersecuritySonIA Cybersecurity — from the office to the plant

The film starts from all the cybersecurity in the product and goes down to industrial plants.

Go to the page →
The method in 9 steps

One critical plant at a time, one step at a time

Each step has its part of the standard and something that is delivered.

  1. A single critical plant, chosen with you

    The one that costs the most when it stops. That is where we start.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-2 · scope of the system under consideration
    What is deliveredSigned scope
  2. Passive inventory

    A traffic capture of 24-72 hours: the industrial devices and protocols that are really seen (for example Modbus, S7, EtherNet/IP).

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-2
    What is deliveredList of devices and services
  3. Zones and conduits

    Devices are grouped by function and by level of the Purdue model.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-2
    What is deliveredZone register
  4. Flows with a verdict

    Every flow towards the controllers has an “allowed, yes or no”, who decided it and until when.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-3 · SR 5.1 and SR 5.2
    What is deliveredAccess map
  5. Target security level per zone

    The target level (SL-T) comes from the risk: it is not the same for the whole plant.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-2
    What is deliveredSL-T per zone
  6. System requirements and gap

    The requirements are compared with what is there today (achieved level, SL-A).

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-3
    What is deliveredGap per zone
  7. Supply chain and remote access

    Remote access by suppliers and maintainers, components: each with its own expiry date.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-2-4 and 4-1 · NIS2 art. 21.2 d)
    What is deliveredList of supplier access with expiry dates
  8. Network segregation

    The separation rules come only from the allowed flows.

    Part of the standardIEC 62443-3-3
    What is deliveredProposed rules
  9. Stepped cost/benefit plan

    First, what reduces the most risk for every euro spent.

    Part of the standardSummary of the method
    What is deliveredPlan and quote
The rules that do not bend

One wrong packet can stop a line

1

Passive observation only

We work on traffic captures made by the customer or together with them. Never a packet towards the plant's controllers.

2

Written authorisation before starting

Scope, plant, period and contact person. Without it, the assessment does not start.

3

Captures stay on a dedicated machine

On an encrypted disk, never on other systems; they are deleted at the end of the engagement, with a written record.

4

Every statement carries its evidence

The register row, the observed flow with its date, the check that flagged it.

What it finds, with a real example

Test on a public capture from a demonstration plant

It is a public demonstration capture with three industrial protocols observed, Modbus, S7 and EtherNet/IP (CIP): it is not a customer.

160connections read
43,704industrial requests analysed: 15,976 Modbus, 10,568 S7, 17,160 EtherNet/IP (CIP)
5zones reconstructed
10flows reconstructed

What emerged

2 errors

Writes towards the controllers that nobody had decided to allow.

10 warnings

Flows outside any documented conduit.

Zones without a target

No zone had a target security level or an owner.

An access from outside

A remote desktop session to the supervision server, from a network outside the plant's zones, already open when the capture began: an access from outside with no recorded decision.

The five zones

  • Controller cell
  • Supervision
  • Data historian
  • Plant network
  • Corporate network
The automatic checks

Six questions the register asks itself

Each check has a technical name in English and an explanation in plain words.

Undecided flow into control

Flows towards the controllers without a decision

Something writes to or commands a controller and nobody has ever decided whether it is allowed.

Outside into control

From outside towards the controllers

An external network reaches the control zone directly.

Remote access without expiry

Remote access without an expiry date

A supplier or a maintainer connects remotely and the access has no end date.

Flow without conduit

Flows outside a conduit

Two zones talk to each other without a documented connection.

Security level gap

Gap between achieved and target level

The zone is below the security level it has set itself.

End of support in secure zones

Unsupported devices in secure zones

A device the manufacturer no longer updates sits in a zone that requires a high level.

What is delivered

Seven documents, each with its evidence

  1. Register of zones and conduits, with the levels of the Purdue model (CSV and PDF)
  2. Map of access towards the controllers, the worst first
  3. List of the observed devices you did not know about
  4. Supplier remote access, with verdict and expiry date
  5. Target security level per zone and gap from the current state
  6. Stepped plan with costs and risk reduction
  7. How the assessment connects to your NIS2 obligations (D.Lgs. 138/2024, ACN measures) and to the national framework
How the product is built

Version 1.0.1: a dedicated server per customer, same-day activation

The SonIA passive sensor reads the captures, the SonIA zone register puts them in order, the SonIA access map shows what to decide. On a dedicated server in an ISO 27001 certified European data centre.

Installation from a single command

Repeatable: the second time it changes nothing and does not touch the keys.

Pinned versions

Every component is fixed and verified by fingerprint.

Encrypted disk

The key is held outside the machine and is never written to disk.

Internal keys generated on site

No secret copied from elsewhere.

Encrypted backups

With tested restore: backup, simulated damage, restore, same counts.

Locked after a restart

Everything stays stopped until the disk is unlocked.

Automatic acceptance test

At the end of installation the product tests itself on the demonstration plant.

The status, stated honestly

Tested on a clean test environment, created from scratch at every run: reproducible. Advanced search dashboards and continuous monitoring are coming soon.

Secure development of our software

The eight practices of IEC 62443-4-1 and what we already do

Part 4-1 concerns those who produce software. Here, for each practice, is what is already part of the way we work. Compatible with IEC 62443-4-1: no third-party assessment is claimed.

1

Security management

Every release goes through a single path with automatic checks; the secure development rules are written down and come from real cases; no block stays silent.

2

Security requirements

The contract of every function is written before the code; each customer company's data stays in its own isolated space.

3

Secure design

A single engine; every piece of data carries its organisation and its company; every write goes through preview and Authorise.

4

Secure implementation

Written secure coding rules. Isolation between customers is measured on the code by automatic analysis: today it is a measurement, not yet a block on every release.

5

Verification and validation

Testing in the browser with the real role of whoever will use the function; automatic checks at every release.

6

Defect management

Defects are our responsibility; every real case becomes a written rule.

7

Security updates

Releases with their evidence and a fast lane for urgent fixes.

8

Guidelines for those who use the product

The Guide page inside the product and the directions that accompany the first sign-ins.

And supplier risk?

It is in the same product: qualification, control tower, impact in euros and protected payments.

Go to SonIA SRM →

See risk and defence from the same place

One product, two viewpoints: SonIA SRM and SonIA Cyber.